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Let’s begin with a rather personal question. Can you tell us 
some details about the history of your engagement with 
Spinoza? Does it date back to the seminars with Louis 
Althusser at the École Normale Supérieure (ENS), or does it 
precede it? What was it in Spinoza that affected you? 
Pierre Macherey: In October 1960, at the beginning of my third year of 
study at the École Normale Supérieure, which I had entered in 1958, I 
went to see Canguilhem, whose classes I had been following diligently 
for several years (it is from these classes that I owe a large part of my 
philosophical training), to ask him to direct my master's degree, with 
the proposed subject subject “Philosophy and Politics in Spinoza.” I had 
previously spoken to Althusser, who was officially monitoring the work 
of the ENS students enrolled in philosophy as an agrégé répétiteur (or 
‘caïman’ in the jargon used in the establishment): it was he who advised 
me to direct my work towards the 'political' aspect of Spinoza's work. This 
topic had not been dealt with by the French commentators of Spinoza, 
and presented an opportunity for me to explore an almost untouched field, 
which was particularly exciting for a novice student. 
My interest in Spinoza was established, and dated back to my 
years of study at the lycée, then at the university, where I attended, in 
1958, the courses of an extremely energetic, passionate, and convincing 
person who was a lecturer with Vladimir Jankélévitch, Dina Dreyfus 
(she was Lévi-Strauss's first wife, the one who had accompanied him 
on the expeditions recounted in his book Tristes Tropiques). As part of 
the preparation for the certificate of “Moral and Political Philosophy” 
for the Bachelor of Philosophy, she gave me the first introduction to 
the demonstrative network of the geometrical structure followed in the 
Ethics; for her, Spinoza was not a more or less well-crafted package of 
general ideas to be glanced over (that was mainly how it was taught at the 
time, in a brief and cursory way), but a demanding and rigorous thought 
experiment, a difficult and complex journey, which needed to be followed 
word by word, as one later learned to do systematically by following the 
lessons of Gueroult (whose major works on Spinoza were published in 
1968, and they completely changed the way Spinoza was read in France, 
by paying close attention to the detail of the texts and to the issues 
of reasoning behind them). Thanks to her, I understood that Spinoza's 
philosophy is not a doctrine alongside others but rather represents a 
different way of doing philosophy. 
This idea was confirmed by Althusser, who was also convinced 
of the singular character of the tight dynamic of reflection set in motion 
by Spinoza, who, in his eyes represented a real turning point in the 
history of philosophy. During my first years of university studies, I had 
also been struck by the teachings of Deleuze (then a lecturer in the 
history of philosophy at the Faculté des Lettres under F. Alquié). These 




















courses influenced me in a way that I could not have imagined. But at 
the time he was not teaching on Spinoza (I had unforgettable classes 
on Nietzsche and Kant), and it was only later, when he published his 
thesis on Spinoza and the problem of expression, that I learned that he 
was devoting special attention to him. Spinoza's standout philosophical 
contribution was, moreover, at the center of the discussions he had with 
Althusser in 1965, some of which I later witnessed. At first, my proposal 
for a master's degree was not well-received: Canguilhem, who was known 
for his difficult character, got angry and told me: “You’re making fun of 
me, I don't know anything [about Spinoza]!” (his official specialization 
was in the history of science and epistemology). But he finally agreed. 
I understood afterwards that what convinced him of the merits of my 
approach and his decision to support it was precisely my insistence on 
the political aspect of Spinoza's thought, which had been neglected until 
then. Canguilhem did not expressly adhere to any system of thought. 
He was neither Platonist, nor Aristotelian, nor Cartesian, nor Kantian, 
nor anything of that kind, but was interested in all of them freely on the 
condition that they were “true philosophy.” 
Behind the name of Spinoza one finds that of Cavaillès. The latter 
had been at the origin of Canguilhem’s commitment during the war 
against the Vichy regime and the German occupation, and was for him 
a model of thought and action, as he explained in the commemorative 
writings he had devoted to him. Yet Cavaillès expressly declared himself 
to be a ‘Spinozist,’ including his philosophy of mathematics, which was 
partly phenomenological. Consequently, it was the phrase “philosophy-
and-politics” (whose formulation I owed to Althusser) that caught 
Canguilhem’s attention: he no doubt saw in it a kind of projection or 
extension of Cavaillès’ militant approach, a reference that for him was not 
formally academic but was at the heart of his own philosophical attitude. 
The year during which I prepared this work (which consisted of a 
hundred-page dissertation) was very studious and was an opportunity for 
me to cross a threshold in my philosophical training. It was also politically 
restless; it was the time of the OAS, of the final upheavals of the Algerian 
War, which were particularly violent during the first years of the Gaullist 
regime. I was very active, and it was difficult to reconcile research work 
with this engagement, but I managed to do so as best I could, and, at the 
same time, I found myself right in the middle of ‘philosophy and politics,’ 
in the very heart of the matter, which Canguilhem, on the contrary, had 
understood and had not disapproved of. It was also in that year that I 
met Étienne Balibar, with whom I later worked with He had just entered 
the ENS and immediately shared my keen interest in Canguilhem's 
teaching, which he also began to follow closely (two years later, he 
prepared a master's thesis on “The idea of work in Marx,” also supervised 
by Canguilhem). Canguilhem followed my work quite closely, which at 
the time was unusual for a ‘mandarin’ at the Sorbonne: generally, his 




















colleagues looked down on their students’ work from a great distance 
and were careless and condescending. By contrast, he advised me with 
increasing benevolence, and was happy with the result I had achieved, 
which encouraged me very much and was decisive for the continuation of 
my studies.
I don’t remember Althusser particularly helping me in the 
realisation of this work, for which he had only given me the initial idea: 
that year he was often absent for health reasons, a chronic problem with 
him which only got worse later on. I did not enter into a close working 
relationship with him until two years later, after I had successfully 
passed the agrégation in philosophy (Canguilhem was on the jury): this 
result, which was far from being a given as it was a particularly selective 
examination, allowed me to get an additional year of study at the ENS, a 
year completely free of any obligation and thus devoted to free research. 
When Althusser was present , he took the enrolled students in philosophy 
very seriously, he 'prepared' them, he advised them, he gave a few 
lectures, he corrected essays in his own very original and stimulating 
way, but that was as far as it went, and I don’t remember having any real 
in-depth discussion with him before the start of the 1962 school year, i.e., 
at the beginning of my fifth and last year as a student at the ENS, which I 
left in 1963 to do my military service at the Prytanée de La Flèche (in the 
very place where Descartes had been a student of the Jesuits!). Étienne 
Balibar and I had spent part of the summer preparing a translation of 
Engels’ “Outline of a Critique of Political Economy,” which was then 
unpublished in French. At the beginning of the school year, we went to his 
office to show him the results of our work, and from then on, everything 
accelerated. We suggested that he organise a cycle of studies on Marx, 
something that had never been done in France in a university context. He 
was struck by the fact that a request of this kind was made by students 
in training, because it coincided with a desire he had had for a long time, 
but which had never materialised. This led to a series of seminars, one of 
which in particular was devoted to the young Marx, which launched the 
collective work which culminated in the two volumes of Reading Capital, 
which was followed in the ensuing years by a “Philosophy Course for 
Scientists,” held at the ENS, which had a very large audience in 1967. At 
that time, I had thought to prepare a thesis on Marx (I don't remember 
exactly what subject I had proposed specifically, but it concerned the 
method of reasoning at work in Capital, and therefore dialectics). It would 
have been directed by J. Hyppolite, the director of the School, who was 
himself very close to Canguilhem and with whom Althusser had a very 
close relationship: but this project, which had been accepted in principle, 
was not followed up. At the time, Althusser advised people who were 
close to him not to enter the institutional university game, and therefore 
not to prepare a thesis: he himself did not defend one until about ten 
years later at the University of Amiens, in accordance with a procedure 




















known as "sur travaux", i.e., without a main subject, a procedure which 
had just been introduced in France. 
I had thus temporarily put Spinoza aside, but he remained in the 
background of my preoccupations and above all of those of Althusser, 
who thought that the elements of Marx's philosophy, a philosophy that 
Marx himself had not elaborated and which remained to be done, were 
to be sought in Spinoza, provided, of course, that the concepts were 
reworked and the content nourished with the knowledge later acquired 
in new fields, essentially in the history of science, psychoanalysis, 
anthropology, political economy (rethought from a critical perspective), 
and, first and foremost, with the political experience linked to workers' 
struggles. Ten years later, I returned to working on Spinoza whereby I 
prepared, on the basis of lectures I had given at the university where I 
was then an assistant, my book “Hegel or Spinoza” which, in 1979, was 
one of the last titles published by Althusser in his Théorie collection 
published by Maspero. At that time, the practices of collective work that 
Althusser had initiated, and which were one of his main contributions 
for those who had continued to follow him, were no longer in use: the 
political and intellectual context had completely changed, with the arrival 
of the “new philosophers,” “les nouveaux philosophes,” as well as a 
renewed interest in the philosophy of human rights from a humanist and 
legalist perspective. In this context, to be considered ‘Althusserian’ was 
not a compliment but rather a stigma. 
You ask me if my early orientation towards Spinoza led me to 
Althusser. This was undoubtedly one of the essential reasons for our 
agreement, especially when we realised that it was possible to attach 
it to broader issues, less narrowly doctrinal and academic. Althusser 
used to say: we must try to do philosophy differently, and he felt that the 
passage through Spinoza made this possible. I say: “passage through 
Spinoza,” because the goal was never to settle on some closed, or self-
sufficient theoretical system, it was, and I take this image from Deleuze, 
to use Spinoza as an optical instrument through which we could see 
things in greater detail, a move which had not yet captured the attention 
of professional philosophers. 
The debate between Spinoza and Hegel is quite 
overdetermined and charged, especially when it comes 
to questions of politics and the state. Maybe one way of 
addressing it is to state that for Spinozists, the division 
between philosophy and politics can be set out from within 
philosophy itself, in terms of accepting and identifying the 
autonomy of politics. Hegelians on the other hand would 
argue that the very concept of reason forces philosophy to 
admit that it cannot make normative demands on politics, 
but that problems are historically posed and solved—to 




















give this Hegel a Marxist twist—by politics itself. This 
means that politics operates by constantly struggling with 
the maintenance, as it were, and reconstitution of its own 
autonomy, without having another instance in view which 
could do the work for it. It seems to us that the question 
between these two different emphases does not so much lead 
to an antagonism in the interpretation of Marx, as it seems to 
be a matter of relocating the question: from where does one 
stage and posit or declare the autonomy of (a Marxist or other 
form of) politics? This is to say that it is either from the side 
of philosophy or from that of politics itself – or maybe one 
has to do both, but in very different ways. The question that 
is at stake between Spinozist and Hegelian forms of political 
thought seems thus to be the following: from which position 
does one speak about politics? Would you agree with such a 
characterization (and please feel free to harshly criticize our 
account)?
PM: When I prepared my book Hegel or Spinoza, the basic source was 
provided by the many passages in Hegel's works devoted to Spinoza, a 
philosopher to whom Hegel attributed exceptional importance (Spinoza 
was the closest to him, but also the one who, as he sensed, challenged 
certain aspects of his own system of thought). I was surprised by the fact 
that he never referred to the political aspects of his thought: yet he must 
have been familiar with the Theological-Political Treatise (which he had 
dealt with in 1802, in Jena, when he had collaborated in the preparation 
of the German edition of Spinoza's works under the supervision of his 
colleague Paulus1). He was not the only one in his time to make this 
astonishing omission: it was not until the beginning of the twentieth 
century that importance was attached to this aspect of Spinoza's thought, 
which had been considered marginal, almost anecdotal, and practically 
ignored for reasons that remain to be explained. This is very surprising, if 
only because of the abundance of writings in which Spinoza, in obvious 
connection with his philosophical positions of a strictly speculative 
nature, addressed political and social problems (the entire second part 
of Theological-Political Treatise, the Political Treatise, not to mention the 
many passages in the Correspondence in which he reacts to the events 
that marked the history of Holland during the 17th century). One of the 
characteristic features of Spinoza's approach is precisely his constant 
concern with questions pertaining to power, servitude, public liberties, 
community life, and citizenship, which he tackles by using notions that he 
has put to the test of philosophical reflection, thus giving them a rational 
1 Lukac 1983, p. 127




















foundation. To demonstrate his originality in this regard, we need only 
to contrast him to Descartes, to whom he owes a great deal in other 
aspects, but who believed that it is best for a philosopher, for reasons 
of prudence, to refrain from intervening in any way in matters of this 
kind. Of course, Spinoza was not the only philosopher of the classical 
era to think philosophy and politics together, nor was he the only one to 
have adopted the posture of what could be called a “philosopher in the 
city,” as someone concerned with the formal, and yet to be determined, 
possibilities of the city’s existence. . Hobbes, to name but one, was also 
a philosopher of this type, though his thought followed a process that 
was exactly the opposite of Spinoza's (his political thought was isolated 
to the point of imagining that it was completely self-sufficient, and it 
took a long time for people to realise or to remember that Hobbes also 
had a metaphysics, a physics, a logic, a theory of knowledge, a theology, 
etc.). But it can be argued that, in his time, Spinoza went even further in 
the effort to link philosophy and politics: he was not content to reflect 
on politics from a distance, to theorise about it, but rather he invested 
himself in its practice to the point of assuming on certain occasions, in 
his own way, an almost militant attitude. In any case, this is how he was 
seen by a number of his contemporaries, who attributed to him, in an 
atmosphere of scandal, the figure of a rebel, an opponent, especially after 
the secrecy was broken that had secured the anonymous publication of 
the Theological-Political Treatise in 1670.
Hegel did not take this into account, and perhaps, even consciously 
or unconsciously, denied it. This is one of the most singular aspects 
of his disagreement with Spinoza, for he too had strongly perceived 
that politics was not an external matter for philosophy, which could 
at best be considered from a distance, in a disengaged, indifferent, 
neutral way. Their political positions were undoubtedly at odds: Hegel's 
conception of the state and its relationship to civil society led him to be 
a defender, even an apologist, of constitutional monarchy in the more or 
less liberalized forms offered by the English model; whereas Spinoza, 
who was extremely original in his time, which made him immediately 
suspicious of all the dominant tendencies, and thus a thinker of 
democracy, which was understood by him not as a separate regime, an 
institutional form subject to particular legal rules, but as a kind of deaf 
impulse, a “conatus,” which is at the origin of all social life that persists 
in unequal degrees of power within the various formations of state, 
including those which, in their form, seem furthest from democracy. By 
schematizing to the extreme, one could argue that Hegel was a thinker of 
potestas (which led him to see in the State "God on earth", the objective 
realisation of Spirit), whereas Spinoza was a thinker of potentia. Its 
immanent dynamic runs with greater or lesser intensity through every 
system and organisational mode of state power and, one might say, 
deconstructs it (from which it follows that the fundamental issues to 




















which social reality refers are not of the order of the state, but of what 
Hegel will conceptualise as ‘civil society’).
In view of this, we are led to thoroughly revise the representation 
of Hegelian philosophy that persists everywhere: according to this 
commonly accepted representation, Hegel was the first to introduce into 
thought the consideration of becoming, and thus to inscribe reason in 
history, whereas Spinoza was merely the thinker of a de-temporalized 
substance, the holder of an abstract and inert universality cut off from 
all historicity. Perhaps it is actually the opposite: the more 'historical' 
of the two would be Spinoza insofar as he refuses to permanently 
objectify the dynamic that carries reality in the direction of its permanent 
transformation, in search of a balance between activity and passivity 
that never ceases to be questioned or destabilised, which obliges one 
to reinvent it endlessly, in the absence of formal guarantees of right. In 
this way, Spinoza would have been the initiator, after Machiavelli, of a 
practical, and no longer exclusively theoretical, relationship to politics, 
with the particularity that this practical relationship is no longer posed 
as an alternative to philosophical rationality but is situated in its wake 
within the same network of necessities. From this angle, Spinoza 
is perhaps, and not only for his time, the political philosopher par 
excellence. For him, political reality was not an object to be examined 
rationally alongside other objects. He did not make a philosophy “of” 
politics or “about” politics, but he conceived and practised philosophy 
as an activity of thought in the strong sense of the word politics. The 
Ethics itself, from beginning to end, and even in its most speculative 
passages (the first and second parts, which are the only ones Hegel had 
studied closely, leaving out the other three), is pervaded by a concern 
with practicality, in which the conditions that make human or non-human 
collectivities more or less viable are implicated by various means.
So, you are quite right to put the question of the autonomy of 
politics at the center of the confrontation between Hegel and Spinoza: it 
is the crucial moment where the tipping point occurs, that makes one lean 
to one side or the other. For Hegel, politics is something whose limits 
can be defined once and for all: it is a specific moment in the course of 
the spirit which, as a moment, is prepared by others and destined to be 
surpassed, "relieved" as Derrida says. Whereas for Spinoza, the idea of 
a succession of the political is quite unthinkable: the political is not only 
a determined moment of the process, it is the process in its entirety. Its 
reason is not a special reason, legitimate within its limits, but it is, taken 
at its source, in its fundamental impulse, the natural movement of reality, 
Deus sive potentia, the universal conatus which is at the heart of things.




















To follow up on this: Spinoza produced a theory of knowledge, 
which could account for the distinction between philosophy 
and politics. Althusser, for instance, argued that the role of 
philosophy for politics lies less in guiding the latter’s action 
or in intervening in the theory of politics, but rather precisely 
in preventing ideology from closing the space for practices 
of indetermination within political activity. Political activity 
must thus be essentially philosophically undetermined 
(and consists in undetermining what philosophy thinks 
about it). Is there a place for a Spinozist theory of political 
indetermination (as a form of liberation or emancipation from 
external determinations, from merely heteronomously being 
determined) for you?
PM: I think I answered your question when I explained to you how, to 
my mind Spinoza is thoroughly a political philosopher (while Hegel is a 
thinker who reasons “about politics,” as he does about art, religion, etc.). 
So, I would not agree that Spinoza “produced a theory of knowledge, 
which could account for the distinction between philosophy and politics.” 
On the contrary, it seems to me that he does everything to abolish their 
distinction, in the sense that this distinction would create a threshold 
between politics and philosophy, or to put it differently, would separate 
theory from practice. When Althusser put forward the concept of 
‘theoretical practice,’ which led him to define philosophy as a ‘class 
struggle in theory,’ he was inspired by a profoundly Spinozist concern. 
That said, abolishing the distinction between philosophy and 
politics does not mean merging them and bringing them into the semi-
darkness where all cows are grey: rather, this effort makes the permanent 
passage from one to the other thinkable Everything “here” is a matter of 
intensity, and this is where history and its conjunctures are considered. 
Before Spinoza, there was Machiavelli who was a philosopher or was 
someone who practiced philosophy in politics, as a practitioner, by 
raising questions such as “where are we?”, “what is happening now?”, 
“what position to adopt at this precise moment?”, “how do you get on 
the passing train, having already left and never having to stop, once you 
realise that it is not going anywhere, that it is not regulated by a timetable 
and that it does not have a conductor?”, etc.
To put it this way would be to adopt a radically nominalist position in 
politics; to free it from the mortifying weight of universality; to evacuate 
the fantasies of power in all its forms, to proclaim “neither God, nor 
master, nor tribune;” to initiate a liberating process while being aware of 
the risks involved; to seek to be less and less passive, and more and more 
active, etc. In short, it amounts to asking the question of how to orient 
oneself, a question that never ceases to be raised, under the conditions 
that are always changing, which means there is no ready-made answer 




















to it. This question relates to all areas of existence, and not only what 
we have come to call, by giving the word a restrictive and discriminating 
meaning, “politics,” that is to say, strictly political “affairs,” a domain 
reserved for competent professionals, or those deemed to be such.
Politics concerns what is common, not only because it concerns 
communities, but because it pervades life in all its forms, while avoiding 
gathering them together to place them under the suffocating cloak of the 
universal. And let us not claim that to support this conception of politics 
and its "commons" is to raise the black flag of anarchy, whose blackness 
does not prevent it from being and remaining a flag, a rallying point 
whose fixity is deceptive, a ready-made answer that it would be unwise to 
settle for!
To remain within Althusser’s cosmos for another question: 
In the previous century and within the context of French 
Marxism, he undertook quite heroic attempts to revitalise a 
Spinozist reading of Marx. We all remember how he declared 
that he and his students were not structuralists, because they 
were Spinozist. You being his student and collaborator, do you 
find anything in his work that is worth preserving, that might 
help us think about the present situation? And if so, may it be 
linked specifically to what is Spinozist about his thinking?
PM: In short, you pose the question of Althusser's legacy, which Derrida 
might have called “the spectres of Althusser” in the sense that he spoke 
of “the spectres of Marx.” The singularity of Althusser, we mustn't forget, 
is that during his lifetime he was already a sort of spectre, constantly 
living on borrowed time, like a dead man walking who tried to slip as 
best he could through the cracks of a collapsing actuality, driven by his 
own chaos. This explains the ambiguities, the gaps, and sometimes the 
contradictions of what he left behind and what we must call his “oeuvre,” 
of which it is not easy, and even probably impossible, to examine it in 
order to identify, as we say, the “achievements.” Reading Althusser 
today is a difficult operation, or at least a very delicate one, so closely 
was his work associated with what he called “interventions,” tirelessly 
taken up and reshaped in haste, constantly under pressure, doomed to 
incompleteness, from which they derive both their fragility and their 
original form of relevance, which must be thought together. To be honest, 
I have to tell you that, from a distance, in times that are not at all the 
same, I have a certain amount of trouble getting there now: what I find 
now in Althusser's texts, which are always to be read between the lines 
(which is anything but simple and innocent), is first and foremost an 
overload of interrogations, the indication of unsolvable difficulties, the 
very opposite of "achievements," but rather a repertoire of appointments, 
some of which, most of which, perhaps, have been missed; or, to take up a 




















Derridean theme again, a collection of letters that did not all reach their 
addressees. But this is precisely what makes it interesting, and in a way 
unique and irretrievable, in a sense that he had not foreseen, that of what 
we might call, in contrast to the fantasy of the “Theory” that he cultivated 
and then abandoned, an anti-theory or a negative theory (in the way that 
one speaks of negative theology). Let's not kid ourselves: what remains 
of Althusser are fragments and sketches – the opposite of a system of 
thought.
One of his writings that speaks to me most today is the one 
on the ideological state apparatuses (Ideology and Ideological State 
Apparatuses), so full of suspension points. The phrase “but let's leave it 
at that” comes up again and again and at the same time, it has a sense 
of urgency that is impossible to escape. It keeps going back and forth, 
circling around problems that are largely unformulated. One might be 
tempted to speak of a theoretical unconscious, which plunges into the 
depths of the void and the absence, or at least the incapacity to settle into 
a stable position of identity. In her reflections on this text, Judith Butler 
insists a lot on its religious, almost mystical, background: I think she is 
right. Althusser has been criticized for his cult of scientificity and his 
dogmatic conception of philosophy, which would have led him to adopt 
the authoritarian position of a “master.” This is to forget the feeling of 
anxiety that constantly haunted his positions. It is no coincidence that 
he was particularly fond of the phrase that Lenin himself had taken 
from Bonaparte in campaigns in Italy: “On avance, et puis on voit” (“we 
move forward, and then we see”). He was constantly going through the 
motions, not to say blindly, searching for an opening to slip through 
before it closed, even if it meant changing gears completely when the 
situation required it. This is why it would be futile to try to extract from the 
article on the ideological state apparatus, which is itself an extract from 
a more extensive text on “reproduction” (a question that preoccupied 
him enormously), which remained unpublished for a long time, the 
well-ordered elements of a “theory of interpellation”. What he called 
interpellation, this procedure that constitutes individuals as “always-
already-subjects,” evokes a call launched under conditions that determine 
its success to such an extent that it necessarily fails. It is this failure that 
mobilises thinking, in the absence of a direction that would be fixed a 
priori. Althusser's stances were a succession of sideways steps. This is 
how he moved forward.
From this point of view, he was clearly the opposite of a “good 
conscience,” obsessed with certainties, the type cultivated by a 
triumphant structuralism, which was more so opinion, a journalistic 
construction, than an approach actually practised by the researchers 
under this flashy, ultimately misleading name. The analytical grids that 
Althusser set up were destined to be constantly reworked. Even if they 
were based on strong intuitions, they had no guarantee of legitimacy. 




















They were fallible. The theoretical ideal to which they referred ultimately 
proved to be a mirage. And, in a way, this unsteady form worked, because 
it forced us to think, to take up the problems at the starting point, to start 
again and pursue other directions, without any assurance of success. 
Viewed from this angle, Althusser rather assumes the role of a deceiver, 
forcing thought to be untangled and to set out on new paths, cultivating 
a spirit of research that is rebellious to any form of prescription and 
perpetually unsatisfied: he was certainly not a master of truth. At least, 
this is how I understand him now, as an enigma that disturbs rather than 
as the bearer of shattering revelations whose legacy we need only to 
recover and maintain in order to pass it on to others in identical form, well 
packaged to ensure its preservation at all costs.
Let us proceed to the broader French context. The Spinoza 
who was so influential during the 20th century seems to 
have been to a certain degree a French invention because 
the French philosophy of the previous century established 
a very specific relation to Spinoza. It often pitted him 
against Hegel and thereby seemed to offer an alternative 
perspective on what followed after Hegel, from Marx through 
Sartre, to thoughts on practice, emancipation, and even 
art. It as if parts of the French tradition share Nietzsche’s 
grand declaration: that there was a precursor to his thought 
(i.e., to contemporary, anti-religious, Materialism, etc.), 
namely, Spinoza. Here we are thinking of a diverse group 
of thinkers, who often opposed each other, like Cavaillès, 
Deleuze, Althusser, Gueroult, Balibar, yourself... Some of the 
members of this group argued that Spinozism was a position 
able to oppose the phenomenological, and also religious and 
conservative tradition, which was often viewed as deriving 
genealogically from Hegel. The antidote to Hegel and these 
co-adaptations of Hegelianism was then seen in a different 
conceptualization of action and belief. It has been claimed 
that it was effectively the crisis of Marxism that opened up 
this space for Spinoza. So, was the crisis of Marxism for 
you a crisis of Hegelian Marxism? Did it allow for a return to 
Spinoza in a new way? Does this Spinoza owe a particular 
debt to his French readers?
PM: There was indeed a "French turn" in Spinoza studies in the 1960s. 
It is also a fact that at the same time, in France, there was, to repeat 
Lacan's formula when he spoke of a necessary "return to Freud," a kind of 
"return to Marx," that is to say a reconsideration of the status of Marxism, 
moving in the direction of its re-actualization; a re-actualization that 




















was needed at the moment when it had taken on the appearance of an 
all-purpose vulgate, of an ideological prét-à-porter. It is still a fact that 
Althusser placed himself at the junction of these two movements. That all 
these phenomena were related is indisputable. But one should not hasten 
to conclude that there was a relationship of strict causal determination 
between them that would have rigidly bound them together. Rather, there 
was a crossing between relatively independent causal series, which 
through intersections, conferred on the intellectual conjuncture of the 
time. It was indeed a very rich conjuncture. Its thickness was so complex 
that it prevented this conjuncture from placing itself under any definitive 
form and even destabilized it from the inside, and objectively opened the 
perspective of the reactive and reactionary reflux of the eighties. Was this 
reflux inevitable? This is what we should ask ourselves.
To start from the beginning: at the end of the 1950s, Spinoza studies 
in France were at a kind of standstill. When I began to work seriously on 
Spinoza at the very beginning of the 1960s, the Spinozist bibliography 
was seriously outdated and, as far as the political aspect of Spinoza's 
thought was concerned, it was completely lacking (with the exception of 
very specialized studies that remained restricted, such as those carried 
out by Madeleine Francès): since Georges Friedmann's book on Leibniz 
and Spinoza (Gallimard, 1946) and Lachièze-Rey's book on Les origines 
cartésiennes du Dieu de Spinoza [The Cartesian Origins of Spinoza’s 
God] (Vrin, 1950), there had been nothing really outstanding and the most 
widely distributed edition of Spinoza's works, the one produced in 1954 
in the Pléiade collection at Gallimard, was far from satisfactory. When, 
at the same time, one referred to Marx, it was difficult to free oneself 
from this obligation at a time when, even after the death of Stalin, the 
dogma of "the realization of socialism," to which Russia supposedly 
offered a privileged site, a "homeland," persisted. It was by reducing it to 
a number of ready-made formulas or quotations extracted from different 
parts of his work and treated as general maxims, slogans smoothed over, 
devitalized, and cut off from any grip on the actual, in progress historical 
processes and their concrete contradictions that, in the margins of this 
official Marxism, a few original attempts (Lucien Goldmann in the wake of 
Lukács, whom he had managed to make known in France, Henri Lefebvre 
who had tried to loosen the stranglehold of the DiaMat, Merleau-Ponty, 
author in 1955 of Les aventures de la dialectique, and not much else 
that is really salient), managed to subsist in disorder. Marx's writings, 
apart from Capital (in the official translation by Joseph Roy), were only 
accessible in the precarious versions offered by the Molitor editions, and 
for some of them in the collection of "selected writings" published in 
1934 by Lefebvre and Gutermann with Gallimard. Regarding this decline 
of Marxist thought, Althusser, who had just published his little book on 
Montesquieu in 1959, proposed the following diagnosis: on the one hand, 
Marx had never really been "introduced" in France, for which one of the 




















reasons was the workers' position adopted by the Communist Party at the 
time of its creation, which had installed a climate of generalized distrust 
of anything bearing the mark of intellectuality, which was stigmatized as 
tendentially "bourgeois". On the other hand, Marx himself, leaving aside, 
after 1848, the strictly philosophical reflection, had opened the way to a 
purely economist and formally politicized interpretation of his theoretical 
work. He had in a certain way made possible this detour of his thought 
and its recuperation by a catechism of pure propaganda, where there 
was no more place for the labor of the concept and the labor of the proof. 
Althusser concluded from this diagnosis that the best way to get Marx 
out of the hole he had fallen into – whether he had been made to fall into 
it or whether he himself had unwittingly prepared this fall – was to give 
him back the philosophy he had lost along the way, and which perhaps he 
had never even had: and this absent "philosophy of Marx", it was on the 
side of Spinoza that one had a chance to find it. Hence the necessity to 
reread Marx with glasses borrowed from Spinoza, and by the same token 
to go back to studying Spinoza in order to make these glasses. Marx and 
Spinoza, same fight! Let us note in passing that Althusser was not the 
first to have brought together the names of Spinoza and Marx: there had 
been, among others, Max Raphaël, an author who today is practically 
forgotten and who ought to be rediscovered, and J.T. Desanti, the author 
of the 1956 Introduction to the History of Philosophy, of which the entire 
second part (which contrasted with the first part in which the alternative 
"bourgeois science/proletarian science" was justified and presented 
as gospel of truth) was devoted to a Spinoza who was reinterpreted by 
means of analytical schemes borrowed from Marx.
Serious work on Spinoza had only just begun again. First, there were 
two books published in '63 and '65 by Sylvain Zac (whom Canguilhem 
had discovered in an obscure provincial high school from which he had 
helped him to emerge): L'idée de vie dans la philosophie de Spinoza [The 
idea of life in the philosophy of Spinoza] and Spinoza et l'interprétation 
de l'Ecriture [Spinoza and the Interpretation of Scripture]. From a 
distance these works, which had then the value of a rediscovery, are still 
worth it. Then it accelerated until the explosion triggered by Deleuze 
(Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza) and Gueroult (the first volume 
of his Spinoza, which remained unfinished) in 1968. Then the following 
year Matheron (Individu et communauté chez Spinoza [Individual and 
Community in Spinoza], published in the collection "Sens commun" that 
Bourdieu was directing at the Editions de Minuit). Apparently, fifty years 
later, it is not yet over. It should be noted that a parallel movement, equally 
intense, took place around the same time in Italy, where the two currents 
met in Urbino during a colloquium organized in ‘82 by Emilia Giancotti, a 
person who played an important role in the whole affair. To know exactly 
what happened during this period would require a study of its own. There 
is no doubt that, on the part of some of those who participated in this 




















process, there was a political impulse, carried by Marxism or at least 
by a certain Marxist perspective. But there was also something else: a 
desire of rigor and analysis, after the emotional and syncretic drifts (or 
totalizing in the sense, not of the structure and its narrow formalism, 
but of a universal out of assignable borders) carried by the existentialist 
current that had dominated the 50s. In this respect, Cavaillès, by 
integrating Spinozist interests into his very precise approach concerning 
the epistemology of mathematics, played a crucial role (the famous 
sentence which, in the conclusion of his posthumous work On Logic and 
the Theory of Science, opposes the philosophies of consciousness to 
the philosophies of concepts, was expressly referring to Spinoza in the 
author’s mind) And then there were personal affinities, a propulsive word 
of mouth. And all this snowballed. 
From the meeting of these two movements (the re-actualization 
of Marx and the recallibration of Spinoza studies) resulted in the 
representation of a two-faced Marx: one side of which looked towards 
Spinoza and the other towards Hegel. Projected in the mirror afforded by 
Marx's thought, and used as optical instruments to decipher it, Spinoza 
and Hegel appeared as the terms of an alternative. On Spinoza's side, a 
rigorous, uncompromising, tendentially "materialist" necessitarianism, 
completely de-ideologized, immune to any form of return of the religious, 
and thus re-positivized. On Hegel's side, a rational finalism that exploits 
the negative placing it in service of Spirit and gives meaning to history, 
requalified as History with a capital H, mystifyingly taking its movements 
from its real unfolding. The simplicity, not to say the banality, of this 
confrontation does not hold when we take into consideration the complex 
work of thought that is overdetermined and carried through by both of 
these authors in very different historical environments: it is only when 
their objective was that of rereading Marx and they intended to justify 
the taking of sides, and thus to draw clear lines of demarcation, that it 
was able to function in a situational, in a conjunctural way, while waiting 
for the readjustments without which it is impossible to respond to new 
stakes. On examination, the two figures that emerge from this summary 
face to face are not, taken as such, defensible and are philosophically 
untenable: it is to do a disservice to both Hegel and Spinoza to limit their 
approaches by proposing these reductive, abstract images, carried by the 
logic of "either-or". One must look twice before reducing either of these 
approaches to a completed system of thought, perfectly coherent and 
synchronous, closed in on itself, having an illusory stability.
From a distance, I can no longer see things in this artificially 
simplified form which, in any case, has not made it possible to resolve 
what you call the "crisis of Marxism", and may even have precipitated 
its fatal outcome. What does the term "Marxism" mean today? At the 
very least, things of a very different nature, which are not easy to link 
together. Perhaps it is even from this dispersion of what remains of Marx, 




















a Marx whose identity to himself has become highly problematic, that 
he has a chance to reappear in unpredictable forms, such that in himself 
the vicissitudes of history will have changed him, a different Marx than 
the one that was familiar to us and that, it must be admitted lucidly, no 
longer holds. At the same time, if we still need to come back to Spinoza 
and/or Hegel, concretely to read and reread them, it is not to find them 
conforming to themselves, stuck to fixed, labeled philosophical positions, 
but to release the catalyst of revolutionary transformation, of Veränderung 
as Marx would say, of which their works, through their difficulties, their 
irregularities, their contradictions even, remain bearers. Just as Negri 
proposed to take Marx "beyond Marx", I think we should look for a 
Spinoza "beyond Spinoza" and a Hegel "beyond Hegel."
Hegel claimed that Spinoza can be consistently read 
beginning with one proposition from his Ethics: “the order and 
connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection 
of things.” And it might be quite tempting to read the entire 
Ethics in such a way that we appear to be constantly moving 
back and forth when Spinoza refers back to, say, a proof that 
he developed ten pages earlier or in a previous book of the 
Ethics, while at the same time we are not moving at all, we are 
just enlarging our understanding of the order and connections 
of things, ultimately of the differential substance. What kind 
of reading protocol do you think Spinoza demands? 
PM: The notion of a "reading protocol" raises all sorts of problems and 
must be used with extreme caution. In any case, it can only be used in 
the plural, not only because we cannot apply the same reading protocol 
to philosophers as different, both in form and in content, as Spinoza 
and Hegel for example, but because the authors—and since Foucault we 
know how equivocal the categories of "author" and "work" are—require 
different approaches that require a particular lens. In the case of Spinoza, 
we know that he left a large number of texts unfinished, for very different 
reasons (the writing of De intellectus emendatione was stopped by his 
own decision, while the writing of the Tractatus politicus, whose last 
words are "Reliqua desiderantur," was interrupted by Spinoza's death). It 
is clear that these texts, which represent particularly significant moments 
in Spinoza's thought, cannot be read in the same way as the two books he 
completed, the Tractatus theologico-politicus published anonymously in 
1670, and the Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata, which did not appear 
until after his death, but for which we know from his correspondence that 
in 1675 he sent it to the publisher and then interrupted the printing of the 
text for reasons of caution. Of these two books, we can say that they are 
subjectively finished (since they are so by the very admission of the one 
who wrote them and considered that they could be put into circulation 




















as they are), which is not to say that they are objectively finished (in the 
sense that they would be definitively closed on themselves and would not 
contain any flaw or point of uncertainty).
However, it would be perilous to submit them to an identical 
reading protocol; the first one is a text of intervention, composed under 
the light of reason but in what could be called a mixed language. In its 
first part, The first part is devoted to a philologically and historically 
informed rereading of the Bible that gives rise to debates that are not 
all philosophical, whereas the second part is driven by an objective of 
demonstration, effectively put into practice in the form of a surprisingly 
complex argumentative network, which gives it an internal rigor, though 
whose firmness is perhaps not as absolute as one would imagine 
(Spinoza sometimes drifts, or even contradicts himself, and it is perhaps 
in these moments that he is the most intellectually stimulating). And then 
there is the Correspondence, of which we have only selected bits and 
pieces by the editors of the Opera Posthuma, to which have been added 
some documents discovered later. There is also the Cogitata Metaphysica 
appended to the Principa philosophiae cartesianae, a hybrid writing in 
which fundamentally original and caustic ideas are exposed within 
the framework of a scholastic form of treatise, a particularly explosive 
mixture. Finally, there is the Korte Verhandeling, that was unearthed at 
the end of the 19th century, which is unquestionably a Spinozist-inspired 
text, but is perhaps not entirely written by Spinoza's hand (it was a study-
text which circulated and must have been enriched on this occasion with 
various contributions). I am more and more reluctant to take uniform 
approaches that tend to group contributions in the same way, when in fact 
they are out of sync, something which makes them interesting, and opens 
up the space for reflection. Spinoza is a fundamentally plural, polyphonic 
thinker, whose thinking has developed in situ along different lines, which 
have crossed and uncrossed: and this is largely what characterizes the 
richness and power of his apparatus of thought, to which we keep coming 
back to at different times and in different contexts to discover unexpected 
aspects, as if he had not yet said his last word; in any case, it is not a 
repertoire of ready-made thoughts, but rather an incentive to produce new 
ideas. 
This is not the case for Spinoza alone: all philosophers worthy our 
attention and study belong to this situation. Those who suddenly and 
forever reveal the depth of their thought are also those whose thought has 
little depth and little to tell us.
To come back to Hegel and the particular way in which he reads 
Spinoza: the reference you mention is enlightening in this respect. The 
interpretive paradigm on which he relies, in order to distance himself 
from the orientation of thought that he attributes to Spinoza, takes as 
its pretext a unique formula, the one in which the identity of the order 
of ideas and the order of things is asserted, as if it were self-evident, a 




















parallelist type of reading (the one that Leibniz had been the first to apply 
to Spinoza, already in order to refute him). In the perspective offered by 
this reading, the order of ideas and the order of things are two distinct 
orders between which there is a one-to-one correspondence. But this 
reading is quite questionable. On the contrary, Spinoza maintains that 
ideas and things are linked together within the framework of one and 
the same order, which is the order of causes. Moreover, if ideas fit into 
this order, it is because they are themselves, not representations but 
things, things in their own right which correspond to the way in which 
the understanding apprehends the world under the attribute of thought 
and not under that of extent; but it is indeed the same world, and not two 
parallel worlds, which is seen simultaneously under these two attributes 
according to an order which consequently must be identical. Now, if Hegel 
chooses a parallelist reading, which is obviously tendentious since it 
turns a distinction of reason into a real distinction, it is because, when 
he reads Spinoza's "order of things," he immediately places on this 
discursive sequence the sequence "order of bodies." In other words, he 
wrongly lends Spinoza a "Cartesian" type of dualism (whose imputation 
to Descartes is itself debatable, since it makes the representation of 
a "substantial union of soul and body" difficult to understand), which 
makes thought and extension the terms of an alternative (in obvious 
contradiction with Spinoza's thesis according to which God is both a 
"thinking thing" and an "extended thing", without making him a dualist; 
in being or nature, which is itself divided). From this, everything follows: 
the tendentious interpretation of Spinoza's formula allows us to evacuate 
a certain number of important notions in the economy of his thought, 
like that of potentia, of which the conatus is the derivation, and Spinoza 
becomes an "acosmist" philosopher, "weltlos" as Heidegger might 
say, which is a caricature. But these “misreadings” are not contingent; 
they carry a strong philosophical meaning: if we pay attention to them, 
they grant us knowledge regarding Hegel's own orientation of thought. 
This orientation is revealed when it is projected in the deformed and 
distorted mirror offered by a faulty, and in any case incomplete, reading of 
Spinoza's text. Finally, this is explained by the fact that, when Hegel reads 
Spinoza, what preoccupies him is not Spinoza's thought, which he takes 
as a pretext, but his own, which finds an opportunity to revive itself by 
confronting Spinoza’s.
This confirms that a reading protocol elaborated from a single 
formula extracted from an author and taken to be canonically expressive, 
can only produce partial, tendentious results, which become downright 
wrong if taken as the basis of an interpretative system. Would Hegel 
have allowed us to reread the whole of his work light of this formula: 
"The real is rational, the rational is real," a ritornello in the form of a 
chiasmus which he actually used in the Preface to his Outlines of the 
Philosophy of Right, but which it would be imprudent to turn into a key 




















to deciphering the whole of his thought? Moreover, in order to apply to 
him the conclusions reached in the previous discussion, would it make 
sense to use an identical reading protocol vis-a-vis the Phenomenology of 
Spirit, that great philosophical novel in which the unfortunate adventures 
of consciousness and its failure to reconcile the viewpoints of subject 
and object and of certainty and truth are recounted, and vis-a-vis the 
Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, the teaching manual that has 
been handed down to us with the Bemerkungen (Hegel's own handwritten 
remarks that he had to read orally during his lectures) and the Zusätze 
(additions reconstructed from students' notes where improvisations 
made on the spot were recorded, often unexpectedly illuminating the 
lesson that could be derived from the written passages in the manual)? 
It’s likely that Hegel would not have appreciated someone doing to him 
what he himself had done to Spinoza.
Can we say that Spinoza is the philosopher of Substance, 
which means that there is no mediation between the 
attributes? In our understanding, there is a fundamental 
difference with Hegelian not only as a substance, but also as 
a subject. We can draw many consequences from this – let’s 
say from Althusser’s “history without a subject”, to Deleuze’s 
insistence on the univocity of being, and so on. But we 
wonder, how do you see this, that is to say, how do you read 
the difference between the Spinozist and the Hegelian notion 
of substance?
PM: Hegel focused his reading of Spinoza on the first and second 
parts of the Ethics: this is what led him to make of Spinoza a thinker of 
being and its representation, whose philosophy essentially consists 
of an ontology accompanied by a theory of knowledge. If he had not 
skipped the next three parts of the book and the political texts, he 
would not have been able to argue that Spinoza is the philosopher of a 
substance destined not to become a subject, cut off, as a result, from 
the realities of the world and of life. He did not understand, he did not 
want to understand, he could not allow himself to admit that Spinoza's 
philosophy is above all, as Deleuze characterises it, a ‘practical 
philosophy,’ essentially concerned with the problem of the conditions 
of liberation. It is not by chance that Spinoza titled the great treatise in 
which he gathered the different aspects of his philosophy “Ethics,” taking 
this word in its ancient sense, the one given to it by Aristotle, namely 
a positive art of living (“bene agere et laetari”) and not the statement of 
rules of moralitywhich have above all a restrictive and negative value 
of obligation, and therefore of constraint. The big question that Spinoza 
keeps coming back to is how to become more and more active and less 
and less passive, under the horizon of a substantiality that is not massive 




















and static but dynamically exerts its power in multiple directions and 
without stopping: in this power one participates to varying degrees of 
intensity that can be infinitely modulated, giving rise to a whole spectrum 
of attitudes, each of which negotiates in its own way the relationship 
between servitude and freedom.
Spinoza's reflection on the notion of the possible is a particularly 
enlightening testimony to this concern, which is the common thread 
running through his entire philosophical approach. In the first part of the 
Ethics, it is demonstrated that there is nothing between the necessary 
and the impossible, and that speculating on the possible is a failure 
of reasoning; this leads to the thesis put forward at the beginning of 
the Appendix to the first part of the book: “omnia praedeterminata.” 
This is a thesis from which a rigorous necessitarianism derives, i.e. 
the representation of an order of things whose implacable chains are 
irrevocably tied up. If we leave it at that, the result is that the ethical 
project, which consists in intervening in this order in such a way as to 
introduce modifications to it – changing the world instead of merely 
interpreting it, as we would say in another language –is as such emptied 
of its meaning from the start. Now it must be understood that this leading 
argument is aimed at a precise objective: the evacuation of the ultimate 
prejudice, which effectively, considered from the absolute point of view of 
the God-substance, does not hold water. But this is only one stage of the 
reasoning: in the preamble to the next part of the book, Spinoza explains 
that he is abandoning this overarching point of view, which leads to a 
radical ontologism and blocks all practical reflection; he then adopted 
a new orientation of thought intended to 'lead the soul as if by hand to 
supreme beatitude,' a project whose dimension is openly axiological. 
Now, it is by choosing to go down this path that we are led, step by step, 
to reconsider the notion of the possible: it is consequently redefined, 
by being distinguished from that of the contingent, at the beginning of 
the fourth part of the Ethics, where the idea of a perfect human life is 
introduced as an end to be achieved; and the last propositions of this 
part of the book expose, in the conditional tense—here we are apparently 
in the middle of a utopia, which is astonishing from Spinoza—what a 
life of free men would look like (who would think of nothing less than 
death, would strive to exchange as little as possible with the ignorant, 
would not form any concept of good and evil, etc.). This makes it possible 
to envisage a new relationship with finitude: if it has objectively no 
meaning in the totalising perspective proper to substance, which is and 
acts by virtue of the necessity of its infinite nature without fixing any 
goal in advance, in concrete terms this means that nature, considered 
in and of itself, does not follow any intentional aim, but rather pursues 
all paths that are open to it, planning nothing in advance, finitude 
regains vigour when it is apprehended, through the existence of the 
living, an existence shared with all other forms of modal reality that 




















are limited expressions to varying degrees of the infinite, and even the 
infinitely infinite, power of substance. The project of a better life, which 
in Spinoza's mind is ultimately political because such a life can only 
be a 'common,' an associative and integrated life, becomes legitimate 
even though it seemed to have been invalidated at the outset by the 
damning representation of natural determinism. This relegitimisation of 
the possible does not in any way imply that the principle of the ratio seu 
causa, which has its source in the nature of things, has been abandoned 
in favour of the representation of a world that is artificially and formally 
humanised after having been freed from the straitjacket in which the 
necessity resulting from the infinite power of substance imprisons 
it: but it raises the problem of the conditions under which, within the 
global framework set up by this power, certain vital orientations that are 
evaluated as better according to the criterion of usefulness (usefulness 
being itself what makes one more active) can be privileged. Otherwise 
put, the absolute point of view of substance (which affirms that everything 
is necessary) and the relative point of view of modal realities (which 
are not causes of themselves, the consequence of which is that they are 
permanently balanced between passivity and activity) are not opposed 
term by term, as if they were situated on the same level: once we 
understand that they are at different levels of power and intensity, we are 
entitled to ask the question regarding the adjustment of their effects, of 
which the art of living that is ethics constitutes the implementation.
This extremely simplified summary gives an idea of the complex 
path followed by Spinoza in the Ethics, where a web of necessities 
is not laid out flat and spread out on a single plane, but where these 
necessities are highlighted and modulated by being placed successively 
under different lights, thus opening up the spaces of freedom and 
action in the absence of which the project of an ethics would lose its 
meaning. The narrow and restrictive conception of an intransmissible 
"monism" is responsible for such a flattening, which denies substance 
any prospect of mobility and change: yet substance is not "one" in the 
purely numerical sense of "only one," which in the long run, by making it 
an isolated being, would strip it of its infinity, or, if we want to call it that, 
of its concrete, mobile, and complex thickness; it is one while being many, 
plural in all directions, and consequently open to unlimited perspectives 
of transformation, in a permanent state of overflow relative to its given 
state, whatever it may be, and not condemned to reproduce itself in such 
and such a form in an identical, fixed manner. This is what Hegel did not 
understand because he could not understand it, given the orientation 
of thought proper to his philosophical position, which, reduced to the 
essential, consists of placing becoming and history within the framework 
of a rational teleology informed by the idea of progress, following a 
momentum that appears to advance straight ahead, whereas in reality 
it moves backwards as if drawn or attracted by its goal, the definitive 




















reconciliation of Spirit with itself, the final word of philosophy. The 
interest of Spinoza's philosophy perhaps lies in the fact that it does not 
contain the last word: “Reliqua desiderantur”, “everything is to be done,” 
could be his motto, that is to say, a “practical philosophy.” This is at least 
how I understand the “history without a subject” of which Althusser 
speaks: if it is without a subject, it is because it is in itself its own subject, 
as a process that is not predestined to any end and does not cease to go 
beyond any term and any limit. And it is also in this way that I understand 
the “univocity of being,” i.e. the “plane of immanence” which Deleuze took 
from Scott: this univocity is multi-directional, just as this immanence is 
full, in a state of permanent invention, and not fixed, uniform, monolithic, 
which would be only be so under the condition of having been emptied of 
its power.
How do you square the ontological commitments that 
Spinoza’s thought seems to demand from his readers with 
a more historically informed perspective (with a historical-
materialist one even)?
PM: As I have just tried to explain, I think we have to understand Spinoza 
by removing him from a purely “ontological” interpretation that renders 
unthinkable what Marx calls the historical “Veränderung,” or to use a 
formula that Althusser was particularly fond of, the possibility of “making 
things happen.” Spinoza was not a purely speculative or contemplative 
philosopher who, in order to see things from a higher point of view, 
i.e., by adopting the point of view of an ideal and abstract rationality, 
would have freed himself from the demands of history, and in particular 
the history of his time, in which, on the contrary, he immersed himself 
completely. If it had been otherwise, would he risk putting into circulation 
the theoretically scandalous Theological-Political Treatise, the effects 
of which immediately spread like wildfire throughout Europe? From this 
point of view, his perspective was as 'historically informed' as it could 
be in his time. It was particularly original even in form: the trajectory 
of his life enabled him to accumulate the elements of a diversified 
culture whose main pillars were the Bible, Machiavelli, and Descartes. 
To have put these ingredients in the same bottle and to have created, 
after shaking it, philosophy in the form in which it has been transmitted 
to us proves that he was definitely not afraid of anything, which his 
contemporaries knew perfectly well.
That said, I don't see what interest there would be in applying 
to his work, under the pretext of updating it, a reading grid taken from 
Marxism, Bergsonism, or any other “ism.” Spinoza is perfectly self-
sufficient; he is neither an inheritor nor a predecessor. He was modern in 
his own time and has remained so in other times when different sides of 
his thought have been revealed, but we have not yet been able to make a 




















full assessment of him; to make him fit into the established order, which 
would have nothing new to say about him. We should not look for ready-
made ideas in Spinoza, in the form of an intellectual fashion his strength 
lies in the fact that he continues to make us think, and thus pushes us to 
go further in new, possibly unforeseeable directions. This is what makes 
him a ‘true philosopher,’ in the sense of the ‘vera philosophia’ that he 
speaks of in his letter to Albert Burgh: he has never ceased to amaze us.
At one point you noted: “The truth of philosophy is as much 
in Spinoza as it must also be in Hegel; that is, it is not entirely 
in one or the other but somewhere between the two, in the 
passage that is effected between one and the other.” This 
also seems to inform the title of your monumental book 
Hegel or Spinoza. In that book, you propose a reverse reading 
of Hegel, from the standpoint of Spinoza. That is to say, 
Spinoza functions as a reader-critic avant la lettre of Hegelian 
thinking. Can you tell us a bit more about what is at stake and 
why you see it necessary to return from Hegel to Spinoza and 
(re)read Spinoza with eyes and minds that know Hegel?
PM: The remarks I have just made in answer to your previous question 
should not lead us to set Spinoza apart, to make him a statuary, as if he 
were "the" philosopher par excellence, the only one worthy of the name, 
which would be tantamount to idealizing him: there is no need to call 
oneself a "Spinozist," and to brandish this sign like a flag in order to 
be interested in Spinoza. As far as I'm concerned, I don't consider him 
to be right about everything, and I don't think he's alone in this. I see in 
him and in his work a kind of thinking machine, which works at its best 
when put in confrontation with other philosophers. This is what I meant 
when I suggested that, if there is a philosophical truth, it is neither in 
Spinoza nor in Hegel that it can be found, but "between" them, in the 
space of discussion opened up by their encounter, which has produced 
and continues to produce explosive effects: occupying this interval forces 
one to think, to confront questions that one would not otherwise remain 
unexplored.
In this connection, I would like to make a remark concerning the 
way in which the discipline of philosophy is conceived today. The debate 
between "analytic" and "continental" bears on the problem of reading 
philosophers. The former argue that interest in the doctrinal positions 
taken by this or that philosopher distracts from the real philosophical 
questions, such as whether coffee is sweet in the mouth or in the cup, 
a question that should remain the same whether it is asked in Berkeley, 
Oxford, or Paris, whether it is formulated in the terms used in the Middle 
Ages, the Classical period, or any other, and whether it is labeled with the 
proper name of this or that philosopher; and they reproach “continental” 




















philosophers for having concentrated their reflection on monographic 
research, focused on the question of knowing what Aristotle, or 
Descartes, or Hegel "really said and thought" on a given subject, which 
inevitably has the consequence of reducing philosophy to the level of a 
tedious and vain doxography, against a background of historicist prejudice. 
Reduced to this elementary dilemma, the debate is insoluble 
because it is distorted from the start. Personally, I think that we must 
continue to read and reread philosophers, as they themselves have never 
ceased to do, in order to configure their own philosophical position, 
which cannot in any case be assumed to be sufficient in itself. One does 
not do philosophy by oneself, proceeding to a kind of internal examination 
of one's own thought set up as a universal paradigm, but with others, 
and, at the limit, with all others. It is not enough to take note of what 
these philosophers thought, as if one were reading a meter with the aim 
of recording certain results, as a purely academic conception of reading 
recommends; but it is necessary to try to think with them, by spotting the 
singularities, possibly the anomalies and the difficulties that manifest the 
discursive sites to which their intellectual heritage is consigned, insofar 
as these sites always contain a part of incompleteness. And the best way 
to achieve this is precisely to settle in the "in-between", the interval; an 
interval that can on occasion present the appearance of a chasm opened 
when one puts them in confrontation with others, being animated by the 
conviction that the truth is not to be found as if it were ready-made or 
deposited in this or that philosopher, but constitutes the stake of their 
confrontation such as it continues in the course of a history which, having 
never really begun and going nowhere in particular, is destined to never 
end, to never lead to definitive conclusions, after which, when the show 
ends, the only thing left would be, as in the theater, to bring down the 
curtain on the representation and to return for the applause.
To imagine that philosophizing is an operation validated by 
someone, by whatever name one calls it, and that this person draws the 
matter (the "grey matter") entirely from himself, by placing himself in the 
perspective of an absolute beginning of thought, as pure reflection, whose 
management is assumed entirely by an independent rational subject, 
is hardly reasonable: eventually, the mention of the external references 
from which his reflection has been given can be erased from the account 
of the rumination to of a given philosopher, which, by the effect of a 
rhetorical procedure, formally confers an apparent generality that can 
claim a timeless universality. But this does not prevent the reflection in 
question from having taken place without being supported by others, 
who provide it with elements that it readjusts in its own way by carrying 
out a new arrangement from them, and it is this that constitutes its own 
contribution. Basically, if we think about there is, only one philosophy, or 
we should say, rather, that there is only one "philosophizing" in the sense 
of an ongoing activity destined to continue indefinitely, which crosses all 




















the "philosophies" in which it takes on each time, like a musical variation, 
a different rhythm: to philosophize is indeed nothing other than to 
participate in this uninterrupted movement of thought to which, whether 
willingly and knowingly or not , all philosophers without exception, the 
great ones as well as the small ones, the established ones as well as the 
marginal ones, the good ones as well as the bad ones, the true ones as 
well as the false ones, belong to it, at their own risk and peril, from their 
singular point of view, of which they only have to exploit the advantages 
and the disadvantages, the setbacks and the advances. From the fact that 
this exploitation is singular due to the unparalleled conditions on which 
it depends, because it must be carried out each time in situ, one should 
not conclude that it is solitary, that it constitutes an independent unit, and 
that the whole responsibility of it falls to the individual who occasionally 
assumes the initiative for it, however exceptional he may be, which would 
place him from the start outside of the norm, set apart from ordinary 
expectations, and ultimately inapproachable.
The most interesting thing about a philosopher's work is the ability 
to make something happen: an event occurs that turns  thought on its 
head. Now this event cannot have an isolated meaning: its scope is 
necessarily unanimous, collective, if only because of the resonance it 
produces and which spreads beyond the conditions of its manifestation. 
This is why I consider the opposition often installed between the practice 
of philosophy and the study of the history of philosophy absurd. It’s an 
opposition sanctioned by their academic constitution as autonomous 
disciplines. It is with this concern in mind that I have sought to 
understand what Spinoza became, viewed through the mirror that Hegel 
holds up to him, which is a particular case of the "between" that I have 
mentioned. But in my mind, it is not a question of a face-to-face exclusive 
relationship either. There are many other ways of relating Spinoza's 
thought to other thoughts. If I had the possibility, I would engage in the 
preparation of other studies that could be called "Spinoza or Descartes", 
"Spinoza or Pascal", "Spinoza or Leibniz", etc., which would reveal 
more and more surprising aspects of his approach. And in the end, if all 
these studies could be completed, I would gather them in a book entitled 
"Spinoza or Spinoza," which would highlight within own philosophy all 
the "in-betweenness" of which philosophizing consists in its infinity.
In the last chapter of Hegel or Spinoza, entitled “omnis 
determinatio est negatio,” you discuss determination and 
negation in Spinoza and Hegel, departing from the statement 
“die Bestimmheit ist Negation.” Here you make a very 
interesting point: 
“What Hegel read in Spinoza—and all authentic reading is 
in its own way violent, or it is nothing but the mildness of a 




















paraphrase—matters just as much as what he actually said, or 
rather, what counts, is the effect of these two discourses upon 
each other, because it offers an invaluable insight for each 
them. From this point of view, whether the famous phrase is 
Spinoza’s or Hegel’s, it is the best of symptoms for analyzing 
the relationship between these two philosophies.” 
This brings to mind the beginning of Althusser’s chapter 
in your collective Reading Capital, where he argues that “the 
first person ever to have posed the problem of reading, and in 
consequence, of writing, was Spinoza.” Later, in the same text, 
he proposed the term of “symptomatic reading.” Would it be 
an exaggeration to read your statement from the standpoint of 
the method of “symptomatic reading”? 
PM: The best way to approach philosophers from the point of view of 
what I have just called the "between," which allows us to reintegrate 
them in the endless movement of philosophizing, a movement without 
assignable origin and end, is to spot in them what, if one can say this, 
"makes symptom[atic]": namely tiny accidents of thought which, if we 
pay attention to them, can be revealing of some of their great theoretical 
and practical orientations. These accidents, at first sight imperceptible, 
become graspable when we take into account the relation of what is 
improperly called the "doctrine" of a philosopher and those of other 
philosophers with whom he or she has met on such and such an occasion 
(an encounter which, moreover, can be made only in the mind of a reader, 
even if it has not taken place historically): these events are bearers of 
meaning because of the enigmatic dimension that they often contain 
I have tried to identify clues of this kind by closely examining what 
happened to Spinoza when Hegel undertook to read him, in his own 
way - in a necessarily “twisted” way. Through these twists, which can in 
some cases take on the character of betrayals, something continues to 
speak: "it thinks," and what comes out of it doesn’t necessarily belong to 
Spinoza or to Hegel; it is that something "happens" and "takes place" in 
the interval that separates them.
This kind of reading is indeed "symptomatic," in the sense or in a 
sense close to the one that Althusser gave to this word. What he calls 
"symptomatic reading" implies, first of all, a renunciation of looking 
directly at a theoretical discourse in order to find or receive a "meaning" 
that would be deposited there from the start; and it is to force this 
discourse to say more, by applying to it drifting, lateral reading, which 
proceeds from an angle and takes detours, which leads to partial and 
provisional results, destined to be constantly revised. Considered in 
this way, this type of reading notes how, in the discourses it targets, 
something is happening, things are moving, events are taking place, in 
the wake of which its own operation of analysis is calledto make a place 




















for itself, by playing, as it were, on lacunae which allow it to sneak in. 
To take up a metaphor that Althusser used to characterize political 
action through cross-readings of Machiavelli and Lenin—another way 
of ploughing the field of the "between"—it is a question of catching a 
moving train, even if it means missing it. In this sense, one can maintain 
that true reading must be engaged, it must be conscious of being dragged 
into a discursive cycle that is confused at both ends. 
Does this cycle, which proceeds from discourse to discourse, from 
slant to slant, and from detour to detour, go perfectly round? Precisely 
not. This is what the concept of "symptomatic reading" intends to make 
clear. This method consists in inserting oneself into textual dynamics, not 
by taking them at face-value as with an external glance which purports 
to capture its totality, , but rather, this method advances by implicating 
itself in its failures and by bringing out the impurities, the difficulties. In 
the discursive sequences that it proposes to treat, symptomatic reading 
detects what plays and is played by privileging the imbalances that signal 
an activity which drives it forward, , following an irregular trajectory 
that continues without having a beginning or reaching a definitive end. 
The symptomatic reading is an open process, which moves forward by 
supporting its weak links, as with any historical conjuncture. To account 
for this singular approach, Althusser takes up the paradigm of vision 
by trying to subvert its use: the symptomatic reading separates what 
is visible and invisible, the manifest from the latent. To separate the 
manifest from the latent consists in unraveling the link that the scopic 
impulse artificially supports, which grants the gaze full purchase of 
its “object,” as it does when it presents the latent content as manifest 
in potentiality, and the manifest as latent in action. The latent content 
that the symptomatic reading aims at has nothing to do with a hidden 
meaning waiting to be deciphered or interpreted: it is not a pre-existing 
original meaning, but rather it represents the non-sense, the labour of the 
negative that, from within, plays a part in the production of meaning, and 
orients it toward other meanings. To take into account an operation of this 
kind, forces one to think. A symptomatic reading is necessarily active and 
creative.
A formula of Spinoza's, that Althusser often referred, "verum 
index sui et falsi", is a striking illustration of this way of conceiving and 
practicing the symptomatic reading, insisting each time on the fact that 
it had to be taken in its complete wording, rather than amputated form, 
the "verum index sui," which absolutizes truth by constituting it as an 
isolated entity. This formula means that truth indicates itself only by 
tracing each time the dividing line that separates it from the false, or 
rather, one should say, from a false, from its false, there being false only 
within the framework of the movement in the course of which truth is 
produced, under partial forms, and not "the truth" considered as a self-
sufficient whole: in the same way, in every discursive statement, in so far 




















as it assumes the active form of an intervention, is carried out and at the 
same time is given to read the scission between what in it reaches the 
visibility and what it makes invisible, in search of a precarious balance 
that has no ideal guarantee. Is the formula "omnis determinatio est 
negatio,"which Hegel criticized, actually Spinoza's? It is his while not 
being his: it emerges, as a symptom, from the virtual encounter between 
Hegel and Spinoza, an encounter whose effects has been and still is 
particularly disturbing, and so, philosophically interesting.
Althusser wrote: ‘We were never structuralists, because we 
were Spinozists.’ How do you relate to this position? In what 
sense is Spinoza’s position always already post-structuralist?
PM: Let us not forget that Marx said: I am not a “Marxist!” It is in 
this sense that we should take the formula: we have never been 
“structuralists.” Moreover, “structuralism,” in the general form it has 
been given, has never existed, except in the heads of journalists or 
doxographers who have fabricate fiction for their own convenience. At 
the very least, we could speak of “structuralisms” in the plural, since 
those attributed to Lévi-Strauss, Barthes, Lacan, or Foucault have little 
in common with each other. If there ever was an era of “structuralism,” 
it was in the sense of opening up a space for debate that gave rise to 
permanent confrontations: free-flowing and without final result. What 
Althusser himself at one point called “Theory” was not, as he practised 
it, a complete system, closed in itself, but an invitation to carry on a 
research effort and to wage out a struggle against ready-made ideas: 
it was ultimately a working programme, or if you want to call it, a form 
of questioning destined to be endlessly enacted. If there has been a 
misunderstanding on this subject, which has supports the accusation of 
“theoreticism,” it is because at a certain moment in his career, Althusser 
used and abused the word “theses” to express philosophical positions: 
these famous theses were in reality hypotheses, which only had value 
once they had been put to the test of reality, which engaged them in a 
process of constant correction, as opposed to definitively established 
facts. From this point of view, “to be a Spinozist” (and not a structuralist) 
cannot mean adherence to a system of thought that is supposed to 
exclusively and triumphantly hold “the truth”: it is rather a call for a 
critical, undogmatic dissatisfied thought, which affords the condition for 
a revolutionary catalyst. The formula I mentioned earlier, “Verum index sui 
et falsi,” applies here with exemplary force: there is no truth in itself, but 
only truth that only succeeds in asserting itself by tirelessly confronting 
the false, which it identifies as such because it sheds its light on it, in the 
context of a struggle that must be endlessly repeated. This being so, the 
temptation to be an “-ist” of any kind deflates itself. Spinoza was not a 
“Spinozist”: and if he held this claim, it would have precluded the dynamic 




















of “philosophizing” particular to him. For my part, even if I have worked a 
lot on the basis of texts signed with his name, in my understanding this 
does not justify the claim that I should be labelled as a “Spinozist” or as a 
“specialist” of Spinoza, at least not by choice. 
In the books in which you put forth a materialist approach 
to literature (we are thinking inter alia of Theory of Literary 
Production or The Object of Literature) you propose a 
renewed and powerful way of approaching of literary texts 
that thus far has rarely been taken up in contemporary 
scholarship (with few exceptions, like Warren Montag), 
somewhat similar to the texts on theater and literature 
Althusser wrote. Could you tell us in what way your approach 
is neither hermeneutical nor structuralist? Could one say 
that you are reading literature the way Spinoza reads 
biblical texts? What does it mean to read literary works as 
“expressions”?
PM: If I have been very interested in texts attached to the genre 
of "literature"—a genre moreover very difficult to define and to 
contain within precisely fixed limits so much it is heterogeneous and 
composite—it is by being animated mainly by the concern to widen 
the field of intervention of philosophy. Too often has philosophy been 
confined in the field of a pure speculation, which condemns it to sink 
in a certain formalism; concretely to turn in circle on itself; confronted 
to literary texts or reputed to be such at levels moreover very different, 
the philosophical activity is solicited by fundamentally impure forms 
of thought, either because they are obscure or because they are 
unaccomplished—not by default but, if one can say, by vocation—which 
makes obstacle to a conceptual recovery which allows to make them 
return in the order of the well-known. By confronting itself with literature, 
philosophy is brought to take distance with the conformism that inevitably 
generates the temptation of the withdrawal into oneself proper to a 
uniquely speculative attitude. From this point of view, I was immediately 
diverted from the project of making what is called a "philosophy of 
literature", which would take literature as an external object of reflection, 
by trying to give it a form to which it is necessarily resistant. My intention 
was not to track down traces of philosophical thought in writers that 
could be found in them as if they were on deposit and that it would be 
enough to extract for example, to try to identify a "Balzac" philosophy, a 
"Zola" philosophy, a "Mallarmé" philosophy, a "Proust" philosophy, etc. 
What I tried to do was rather to rework certain literary facts by being 
mainly attentive to what in their production and the modes of reading that 
they call for—that is to say, what one can call their reproduction—can 
lead to thinking in the sense that philosophy gives to this word, with the 




















double value of awakening and provocation, and thus of inciting to go 
further. 
 In 1990 I published the book "What does literature think?" I then 
regretted this title: literature, insofar as one can speak of it as a whole, 
does not think; it makes thought possible, which is something completely 
different. On examination, it appeared to me that literature, or what 
we attribute to it, can be used as a formidable machine to make people 
think, if it is made to function in this sense. When my book was reprinted 
by a different publisher in 2013, I decided to give it a different title: 
"Philosophizing with Literature." To philosophize with literature, and not 
about it, is to walk alongside it, as if it were an optical device that enables 
us to see unexpected things, without which would pass us by and from 
the perspective of pure speculation would hold little value. have In the 
second edition of the book, I have taken up the subtitle that was already 
in the first: "Exercises in Literary Philosophy." By "literary philosophy" 
I meant a way of relating to literary texts which, as I have just said, is 
opposed to a "philosophy of literature": the latter proposes to extract 
from literary texts a philosophical meaning that is supposedly there, in 
the name of a meaning that is already there, latent, dormant, awaiting 
Prince Charming, a philosopher of course! But literature is not a sleeping 
beauty, but rather, it resembles the formula I take up, that of a machine 
that propels thought, that is, if one knows how to start it, and if one uses 
it for exercises in thought. I say "exercises," in the sense of attempts in 
which one engages without a determined result and in the absence of any 
guarantee of legitimacy. In a general sense, I think that philosophy should 
practice this kind of exercise more often.
When one lends ulterior motives to literature to sufficiently 
flush out the philosophical meaning that it secretly nourishes, one is 
inevitably led to make a selection among literary works: one categorizes 
accordingly, holding onto those which have this a particular meaning, 
and casting aside those that don't, such that they lack interest for 
philosophy. In such a perspective, there are, on the one hand, writers with 
an intrinsically “philosophical” dimension, who are considered to be "at 
the height of thought," which justifies entering into a dialogue with them 
on an equal level, this is how Heidegger "reads" Hölderlin, by projecting 
onto the latter's poems his own philosophical preoccupations and by 
trying to extract from them elements that nourish his own reflections. I 
don't see things this way at all: if there is something in literature that can 
make people think, and thus activate a philosophical mode of thinking, it 
is not in the form of a predisposition that certain authors and works which 
would immediately set them apart by assigning them an exclusive dignity. 
The division between great and minor literature, the first being the bearer 
of a philosophical interest of which the second is deprived, has never 
convinced me. If literature is considered in a speculative way—as being 
afflicted, as a deficiency or a sign of impurity, because the imaginary 




















drifts, dragging with it narrative fiction and the affective impulses 
which sever the poetic expression from rational control—it can provoke 
thought, in all of its forms, including those which at first sight appear 
as withdrawn from a properly intellectual and reflected state; perhaps 
even these are the latter which, by their defects, their weaknesses, their 
rejection of what is methodical or conceptual, their irrational spontaneity, 
exerting a demand on thought thus propelling it toward new directions. 
When reading Jules Verne or detective novels, one is unlikely to come 
across speculative sequences that are sufficiently elaborate to make 
it worthwhile to dwell on them for a long time, whereas sequences of 
this kind are abound in the so-called literature of ideas, whereby reason 
figures as primary in the first instance which afford the reader many 
opportunities to question himself , to take a step back from what is said, 
to deal with anomalies that can be treated as symptoms, and thus taken 
seriously, provided, of course, that they are considered anew through the 
process of questioning. 
You ask me if I approach literary works in the way Spinoza reads the 
Bible. It is obvious that Spinoza, by ploughing through the Holy Scriptures 
in all directions and in depth, has provided an unprecedented model 
for reading texts: he has marked out the ground on which a rigorous 
exegesis takes place, in particular by submitting to the requirement of 
a historical and linguistic recontextualization of the discursive facts to 
which it applies; following this path, he has subjected the sacred texts 
to a method of reading, which he calls, "natural," thus taking the risk 
of trivializing them, and it is understandable that this approach caused 
a scandal in his time. This method consists in treating the biblical 
accounts at face value, as they are stated, without subjecting them to the 
test of truth, i.e., of the representation that one makes of it in advance: 
considered from this angle, these accounts constitute an irreplaceable 
testimony about what he calls knowledge of the first order , that which 
proceeds from inadequate ideas, , beginning with opinion which is the 
most common practice of thought for both individual and collective form. 
Spinoza thus came to fathom the obscure depths in which people's lives 
are immersed, under the pressure of forces they do not fully understand 
, which tends to place them in a state of servitude and ignorance: the 
Bible is for him a book of truth, not because it delivers truths to be 
given without discussion, but insofar as it best informs about this state 
of unknowing and provides invaluable materials for analysis, which a 
philosophy that is driven solely by the power of the intellect cannot afford 
to ignore and pass over in silence, pretending that it does not exist. If 
the Bible interests reason, it is perhaps because of the content to which 
it refers, it stands at the furthest distance from reason: this rational 
deficit is at the heart of what Spinoza calls the "theological-political," 
a composite and moving reality with hidden aspects he undertook to 
probe. From this point of view, my attempt to philosophize with literature 




















is indeed in the wake of Spinoza's reading of the Bible: it does not credit 
literature with already elaborated philosophies; nor does it treat it as a 
mausoleum, a creation whose value would be sanctioned by an aesthetic 
judgment and thus preserved, but rather takes it as a field to be worked 
on, a raw material that one attempts to transform by looking attentively 
at some of its singularities that may occasionally present themselves as 
irregularities, which, and I take up the formula that I used earlier, makes 
one think. Having said that, I do not believe that we can find in Spinoza 
a "method of reading" that can be applied to literature, only because, if 
we follow the rules of a once-and-for-all defined method, we inevitably 
limit it, we render ourselves inattentive to the text and what could be 
called an event. In this respect, I refer you to what I said earlier about the 
difficulties raised by the notion of a "reading protocol:" it is each time, 
that we must find the partialities that allow us to make texts speak, that 
is to say, to identify the symptoms that can stimulate creative reflection, 
that produce new forms of thought.
In neurosciences, Spinoza is seen as a very important figure. 
Antonio Damasio, in his Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, 
and the Feeling Brain, argues that Spinoza has foreseen the 
discoveries in biology, as well as the neurological vows on the 
relation between the mind and body. Damasio sees Spinoza 
as a proto-biologist. How do you see the relation of Spinoza 
to neuroscience, or even to psychoanalysis? 
PM: Spinoza himself was very interested, as Descartes had been before 
him, in the medicine of his time. It is clear that the thesis stated at the 
very beginning of the fifth part of the Ethics according to which mental 
and bodily affections correspond to each other ad amussim), which 
formally opens the perspective of a new psycho-somatic medicine. I say 
"formally," because this idea, which, in breaking with traditional dualism, 
revolutionized the conception of the relationship between mind and body 
, which historically did not bear influence on the development of medical 
ideas: it was not until the 20th century that this way of seeing was taken 
seriously and that we had, in retrospect, the revelation that Spinoza, 
beyond the possibility of any kind of objective guarantee , marked the 
possibility of thinking in this speculative way. We must therefore be 
careful not to present him in this respect as a precursor, which is only 
possible as a projection. It is a fact that contemporary biologists such 
as Antonio Damasio or Henri Atlan, for example, recognize themselves 
in Spinoza, and seek to bolster their interpretations and results after 
the fact, by following a non-speculative path, thus delimiting the scope 
of their research But, this should not lead one to argue that Spinoza 
had anticipated and in some way prepared for their scientific approach, 
for his thinking was in fact on a completely different plane. If Spinoza’s 




















philosophy can be considered as "actual," it is insofar as the ideas and 
demonstrations found in the text of the Ethics set up rational chains 
which, if not by founding science or substituting it, it occasionally 
instructs it by allowing a better understanding of the results by using its 
own means. A topos of this kind is, one can say, an eternactuality, that 
breaks with the notion  that the past intervenes on the present, leading 
us to interpret the relation of the first to the second according to the 
modalities of the "already" and the "not yet," which imply the reference to 
a finality: it is thus necessary to avoid placing Spinoza's philosophy and 
neurobiology in the common movement of a history which would unfold 
on common ground. 
If Spinoza's thought has a persistent intelligibility it is because 
he was careful not to push his philosophy beyond the limits imposed 
on them by their nature as philosophy, which prevents it from eclipsing 
the discoveries of science for the simple reason that it [philosophy] is 
not within their reach. Unlike Descartes, who was convinced that by 
using a mechanical model one could manufacture a complete knowledge 
of the laws of bodily nature, Spinoza claimed that "we do not know 
what a body can do." Today, it seems that we know much more, while 
scientific experimentation has developed in conditions that are out of all 
proportion to those available in the seventeenth century: in the light of 
what we know today, distinctions such as those that Spinoza makes in 
the postulates of his "little physics" (the set of considerations set out 
between propositions thirteen and fourteen of the second part of the 
Ethics) between fluid, soft and hard bodies, rightly appear derisory. We 
certainly know more, which feeds the illusion that, perhaps, as far as life 
in general and cerebral life in particular are concerned, the veil of Isis is 
not far from being lifted. Now, what we can find in Spinoza is precisely 
the critical device that allows to dissipate this illusion which, by its own 
logic, inevitably leads to a reductionism, whether it is idealistic as it is 
the case of the finalist theories of intentionality or materialist as it is 
the case of the mechanical theories of the transmission of information 
through bodily channels. If philosophy is able to serve science, it is by 
bringing its investigations within the limits of simple reason, limits that it 
is naturally exposed to cross: in this respect what Althusser wrote about 
the "spontaneous philosophy of the scientists" remains enlightening. 
As for psychoanalysis, which is above all, , a caring practice 
enriched by theory in the precise sense, not “applied” theory, it seems 
that Spinoza’s advances present strong analogies with psychoanalysis. 
For instance, in the first twenty propositions of the last part of the Ethics, 
where the emancipatory project takes on the appearance of a real "cure," 
in which the body and the mind are simultaneously engaged, against the 
background of affect, including the primordial affect of desire , which 
it attempts to manage by progressively widening its scope: rereading 
Spinoza in the light of Freud's Metapsychology can be justified by this 




















precise point. But this comparison comes up against limits that must not 
be crossed: and it is precisely the revelation of these limits that makes 
it enlightening in its own way. The “cure” of the imagination advocated 
by Spinoza and the “cure” of the Freudian unconscious differ by way 
of substance. Briefly, we can say: Freud's analysand tells his stories, 
and for that he requires the mute presence of the analyst to whom he 
tells them; whereas the objective of Spinoza's ethical subject is to stop 
telling himself (imaginary) stories, and for that he doesn't need the 
affective presence of another to whom he can talk, because he doesn't 
need to pass through the meditated, symbolic realm of language.. The 
interventions on behalf of the imagination—consist of putting order in 
the representations directly associated to passionate affects, in order 
to imagine more and more intelligently ("magis vivide et distinctius") or 
less and less "simply" (simpliciter)—the following twenty propositions, 
which end the journey of the whole Ethics, set the emancipatory project 
on a completely different path where the soul is treated as separate 
from the body and its accidents, allowing it to "feel and experience 
itself as eternal," rising to the level of the pure and ineffable joys of 
the "amor intellectualis Dei" where the affective and the rational are 
entirely merged: one is then drawn into an almost mystical realm which 
is situated beyond the plane of medicine and psychoanalysis. Should we 
give in to this ultimate drive? This is a question that we have every right 
to ask ourselves.
In what way does a materialist theory of literature allow us to 
understand that literature forms and shapes ideology? Can 
we formulate a theory of why a certain form of what you call 
“false totality” is unavoidable or necessary, and still learn 
something about its constitution? Otherwise put, does it[false 
totality] attempt to account for what internally divides and 
separates the literary work from itself (whereby it becomes a 
multiplicity)?
PM: It seemed to me—and this is a working hypothesis—that literature, 
a complex reality with uncertain frontiers and of which it is impossible 
to go around (and a fortiori to present a complete theory), can be used 
as an observer of the mechanisms of ideology: it brings out certain 
articulations, the limits and the other side of its functioning and possibly 
the failures or shortcomings. This explains its paradoxical situation: 
literature is completely immersed in the ideology that constitutes its 
material surroundings, and at the same time it looks at it from a distance, 
which allows it to emerge from it and make it emerge from itself. It is 
both inside and outside, at a subtle turning point where it only takes a 
little for it to go one way or the other. It can be said that it plays with 
ideology while at the same time making it play at the risk of making it slip 




















and sometimes disjoin. It is this equivocal position, between balance 
and imbalance, between sense and nonsense, that has preoccupied 
me the most: I have tried to read texts labelled as “literary” in order to 
identify the points of rupture, the blind spots, where things crack, which 
forces us to reflect. This approach has nothing to do with the attempt at 
legitimisation based on the traditional criteria of aesthetics: I have not 
attempted to distinguish between beautiful forms and others that do not 
deserve this qualification, which establish a hierarchical classification 
supported by value of judgments. But neither do I claim that the type of 
detouring approach I have chosen is exhaustive and invalidates others 
with which it would compete. To put it bluntly, I am not interested in 
what literature “is”—which, given the instability of the literary world, 
is perhaps definitively impossible to know: in this respect, I leave the 
problem to others—but as to what it ‘does,’ and as to what one can do 
with it by maintaining a partisan relationship with it, a partnership that 
combines complicity and refusal; it is a kind of cat-and-mouse game 
whereby one never knows who is the cat and who is the mouse. In the 
context of our present discussion it would be difficult for me to go any 
further on this point: moreover, I am increasingly reluctant to enter 
a circularity where theoretical statements of a general nature about 
“literature” are bound to go round and round ; I prefer to devote myself to 
“exercises in literary philosophy” a practice which savors particularities– 
of which there are many – where literary texts, carefully approached 
from certain angles, and not claiming to exhaust their content or, as we 
say, their “meaning” leads in an often unexpected way, to doing a little 
philosophy with them, in their company and on their margins, and perhaps 
leads to doing philosophy differently.
We are doing this interview in the midst of the pandemic 
COVID-19. Here one might also be reminded of Spinoza’s 
“the free man does not think of death.” In the present context, 
this is not meant to dismiss the real threat of COVID-19 – 
as right-wingers, truthers and some on the left do, on the 
contrary. The difficulty to obey Spinoza's dictum seems to 
lie in the absurdity of thinking about death in any form as 
a motivational force. What is your take on this Spinozist 
line? Might we be so unfree and so thinking about death is a 
symptom of this? 
PM: Spinoza does not say that the free man "does not think of death", 
but that "he thinks of nothing less than death" (de nulla re minus quam 
de morte cogitat). This strange, roundabout formula, which he decided 
upon after much reflection, must be taken literally: it means that the free 
man thinks about death in the mode of "nothing less than," that is to 
say that he tries to control as much as possible the affects unleashed 




















by his awareness of his condition of mortal being—would he be free in 
the absence of this awareness?—linked to his nature as a finite mode, 
therefore he exerts himself to support, and to live this perspective as an 
alternative to being dominated by the fear of the death which makes one 
passive. One must conclude that it is impossible not to think about death 
at all, except to escape into a world of pure fiction whose representation 
is even more dangerous than any fatal accident. Death, one cannot 
stop thinking about it, one always thinks about it, unless one sinks into 
unconsciousness: all one can do, or try to do, is to think about it, in a way 
that brings it into being , which is inevitable in any case, and to its proper 
measure, thus in the mode, of "nothing less than," as something that is 
going to happen but does not have the importance that the imagination 
lends to it by forming an inadequate, mutilated and confused idea of 
it. In other words, the free man is or would be the one who tries to live 
his death in a peaceful way, in an atmosphere that has nothing morbid 
or mortifying about it: this is what he has to do best, and of course it is 
not easy to achieve this. To think of nothing less than death, consists in 
understanding and accepting that death is an integral part of life, that it 
is a necessary moment, that it takes place in its course, to the point that 
the temptation to escape it is not only vain, but fundamentally harmful: it 
poisons the whole existence by delivering it to despair and madness.
Following this line of reasoning, Spinoza's project would therefore 
be to remove death and its representation from the jurisdiction of 
the negative, and consequently to repositize it. What does it mean to 
repositivize it? It can only mean to apprehend it more and more from a 
positive point of view, therefore less and less negatively: it is an effort 
(in the sense of "conatus"), and therefore a tendential movement that 
launches itself forward without speculating on its outcome. . From this 
point of view, death as a condition that accompanies the whole of life is 
one thing that would be difficult and harmful not to think about at all; and 
death as an event, that is, as an accident, that puts an end to life and cuts 
short the momentum of the conatus, is another thing, which should not 
be confused with the previous one. Becoming aware of this distinction 
liberates us; it makes us more active and less passive. Death as a 
condition is a necessary determination of our nature: it is consequently 
the object of certain knowledge, insofar as its cause is in us. Death as an 
event necessarily occurs, but its cause, which is certainly not in us, must 
escape us, which affects it with a certain dimension of contingency. Its 
cause remains unknown because it is not in reality a cause but an infinite 
multitude of causes whose meeting does not obey any internal or external 
finality: this is what Spinoza explains in the Appendix to the first part of 
the Ethics, devoted to a radical critique of finality, in the often commented 
passage where he uses the example of a banal and disconcerting event 
(a man leaves his house to go and see his friends; as he crosses the 
threshold of his door, a tile detached from the roof by a strong wind falls 




















on his head and kills him); if this event seems indeterminate – it is in the 
gap freed by this absence of determination that the representation of an 
end comes to lodge itself, to fill the hole in a way – it is because it is too 
determined, so determined that it is impossible for a finite understanding 
to master the totality of the chains of which it is a part; if this is 
understood, one will grant it less importance, one will avoid feeding 
fears by drowning it under streams of imaginary preoccupations. From 
this point of view, yes, we can say that the free man does not think about 
death: he does not think about the death-event, even though he cannot 
avoid thinking about death-condition, which has another nature because 
it cannot be reduced to an event determined by an unlimited number of 
causes which, because of this unlimitedness, must remain unknowable. To 
think of nothing less than death is to occupy, as best we can, the interval 
between these two incommensurable figures of death which are death-
condition, of which it is possible to form an adequate idea, and death-
event, which can only be represented through inadequate ideas.
 The analysis I have sketched invalidates the interpretation of 
Spinoza's philosophy that has long been imposed: that of an absolute 
rationalism, which has the last word on everything and ensures the 
absolute triumph of knowledge over ignorance. In contrast, Spinoza 
embarked on the enterprise of a practical philosophy for which the 
dividing line between wisdom and ignorance, between the known and 
the unknown, is never definitively drawn: as one knows more, which 
increases the chances of being active and thus of living more freely, the 
domain of the unknown of which one has a share widens, which makes 
one fall back into passivity. The world as Spinoza sees it is not deflated 
and serene, but unfinished, full of traps, disquieting and worrying: the 
infinitely infinite power of substance engenders it by engaging it from the 
start in an incessant and multidimensional movement of transformation, 
the end of which we will never see, which inextricably mixes production 
and devastation. So, for viruses, not to mention other figures of disaster, 
war, oppression, climate disruption, and others, the best “solution” , in 
the end, would be to think about them in the mode of "nothing less than" 
(de re nulla minus cogitare), that is, not to think about them while thinking 
about them.
One last question: in the last years, the notion of communism 
re-emerged as an important—we would not dare to call it 
central—category of thinking not only politics, but also for 
analysing contemporary capitalism from a standpoint that is 
reducible to what exists already. Do you accredit a (strategic 
or conceptual) significance or value to this signifier, to 
communism as an idea that is worth fighting for? 




















PM: Is there any other idea worth fighting for? I can't think of any. But 
let's not kid ourselves: nobody knows what communism is. It's an idea 
that awaits content; it's a practical idea that we cannot know until it's 
realised, if it's ever realised at all, which we now have far too many 
reasons to doubt, but which doesn't mean that we should give up on it. 
Spinoza can perhaps help us get closer to this, insofar as his thinking 
is nourished by the idea of the "common," which I would be tempted to 
spell "as-one", or simply "as one." "Like one" is not "one" in the sense 
of a totality compressed upon itself and definitively obtained owing to 
this closure: it is a movement or a tendency that one can engage with in 
order to unify the infinite order of causes and effects, that is to say, more 
mastery and control over what happens and does not cease to happen in 
good and in bad ways. It is to cultivate the schema of the “in between”, to 
take up this quite problematic notion that I had on my mind and which I 
used to reply at some of your precedent questions.
Translated by: Agon Hamza & Frank Ruda
Berlin/Lille/Prishtina, April 2021
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